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Abstract
Recently, Zou et al. [Phys. Rev. A 82, 042325 (2010)] pointed out
that two arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes are not secure,
because an arbitrator cannot arbitrate the dispute between two users when
a receiver repudiates the integrity of a signature. By using a public board,
they try to propose two AQS schemes to solve the problem. This work
shows that the same security problem may exist in their schemes and
also a malicious party can reveal the other party’s secret key without
being detected by using the Trojan-horse attacks. Accordingly, two basic
properties of a quantum signature, i.e. unforgeability and undeniability,
may not be satisfied in their scheme.
Keywords: Quantum information; Quantum cryptography; Arbi-
trated quantum signature.
1 Introduction
Quantum signature, which concerns about the authenticity and non-repudiation
of quantum states on an insecure quantum channel [1, 2], is one of the most
∗Corresponding Author
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important researches in quantum cryptography. By exploiting the principles
of quantum mechanics, e.g., no-cloning theory and measurement uncertainty,
quantum signature can provide unconditional security. Two basic properties
are required in a quantum signature [1] :
1. Unforgeability: Neither the signature verifier nor an attacker can forge a
signature, or change or attach the content of a signature. The signature
should not be reproduced by any other person.
2. Undeniability: A signatory, Alice, who has sent the signature to the ver-
ifier, Bob, cannot later deny having signed a signature. Moreover, the
verifier Bob cannot deny the receipt of the signature.
Quantum signature was first investigated by Gottesman and Chuang [3]. After
that, a variety of quantum signature schemes have been proposed [1, 2, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Zeng et al. [1] proposed an arbitrated quantum
signature (AQS) scheme based on the correlation of GHZ states and quantum
one-time pads. However, Curty et al. [6] pointed out that [1] is not clearly
described and the security statements claimed by the authors are incorrect. In
the reply comment [7], Zeng gave a more detailed presentation and proof to
their original AQS scheme [1]. To improve the transmission efficiency and to
reduce the implementation complexity of [1, 7], Li et al. [8] proposed an AQS
scheme using Bell states and claimed that their improvements can preserve the
merits in the original scheme [1, 7].
In an AQS scheme, an arbitrator plays a crucial role. When a dispute arises
between the users, the arbitrator should be able to arbitrate the dispute. The
arbitrator should be able to solve a dispute when a receiver, Bob, repudiates the
receipt of the signature, or in particular, the receiver repudiates the integrality
of the signature, i.e., Bob admits receiving a signature but denies the correctness
of the signature. The dispute of the latter one implies the following three cases
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[15]:
(1) Bob told a lie;
(2) The signatory Alice sent incorrect information to Bob;
(3) An eavesdropper Eve disturbed the communications.
Since the arbitrator in [1, 7, 8] cannot solve the dispute when Bob claims that the
verification of a signature is not successful, Zou et al. [15] considered that these
schemes are not valid because the security requirement of a quantum signature,
i.e., the undeniability, is not satisfied.
By using a public board, Zou et al. also proposed two AQS schemes to solve
the problem. However, this study will point out that the same security problem
may exist in their schemes. That is, when Bob announces that the verification is
not successful, the arbitrator may not be able to distinguish which case described
above has happened. Besides, this study also tries to investigate if a malicious
signer, Alice, can reveal Bob’s secret key without being detected by performing
the Trojan-horse attacks [16, 17].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Zou et al.’s
schemes. Section 3 shows the problems with the schemes. Finally, Section 4
concludes the result.
2 Review of Zou et al.’s schemes
Zou et al.’s AQS schemes [15] are briefly explained in the following scenario.
Alice, the message signatory, would like to sign a quantum message |P 〉 to a
signature verifier, Bob, via the assistance of an arbitrator, Trent. Suppose that
Alice and Bob share a secret key K ∈ {0, 1}
∗
, and the quantum message to be
signed is |P 〉 = |P1〉⊗|P2〉⊗ ...⊗|Pn〉, where |K| ≥ 2n, |Pi〉 = αi |0〉+βi |1〉, and
1 ≤ i ≤ n. In order to protect the quantum message, the quantum one-time-pad
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encryption EK [18] and the unitary transformationMK used in the schemes are
defined as follows.
EK (|P 〉) =
n⊗
i=1
σK2i−1x σ
K2i
z |Pi〉 , (1)
MK (|P 〉) =
n⊗
i=1
σKix σ
Ki⊕1
z |Pi〉 , (2)
where |Pi〉 and Ki denote the ith bit of |P 〉 and K, σx and σz are the Pauli
matrices, respectively.
To prevent the integrality of a signature from being disavowed by Bob, Zou
et al. proposed two AQS schemes: the AQS scheme using Bell states and the
AQS without using entangled states, respectively. Their schemes are described
as follows.
2.1 Scheme 1: the AQS scheme using Bell states
Suppose that Alice wants to sign an n-bit quantum message |P 〉 to Bob. In
order to perform the signature, three copies of |P 〉 are necessary. The scheme
proceeds as follows:
Initializing phase:
Step I1. The arbitrator Trent shares the secret keys KA,KB with Alice and
Bob respectively through some unconditionally secure quantum key dis-
tribution protocols.
Step I2. Alice generates n Bell states, |ψi〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB), where
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the subscripts A and B denote the 1st and the 2nd particles
of that Bell state, respectively. After that, Alice sends all B particles to
Bob in a secure and authenticated way [19, 20].
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Signing phase
Step S1. Alice chooses a random number r ∈ {0, 1}
2n
to encrypt all |P 〉’s, i.e.,
|P ′〉 = Er (|P 〉).
Step S2. Alice generates |SA〉 = EKA (|P
′〉).
Step S3. Alice combines each |P ′i 〉 and the Bell state to obtain a three-particle
entangled state,
|φi〉 =
∣∣P ′i
〉
⊗|ψi〉AB =
1
2


∣∣∣Φ+
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|0〉+ β
′
i
|1〉
)
B
+
∣∣∣Φ−
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|0〉 − β
′
i
|1〉
)
B
+
∣∣∣Ψ+
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|1〉+ β
′
i
|0〉
)
B
+
∣∣∣Ψ−
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|1〉 − β
′
i
|0〉
)
B

 ,
where
∣∣Φ+PA
〉
,
∣∣Φ−PA
〉
,
∣∣Ψ+PA
〉
, and
∣∣Ψ−PA
〉
are the four Bell states [21].
Step S4. Alice performs a Bell-measurement on each |φi〉 and obtains the
measurement results |MA〉 =
(∣∣M1A
〉
,
∣∣M2A
〉
, . . . , |MnA〉
)
, where
∣∣M iA
〉
∈
{∣∣Φ+PA
〉
i
,
∣∣Φ−PA
〉
i
,
∣∣Ψ+PA
〉
i
,
∣∣Ψ−PA
〉
i
}
, and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Step S5. Alice sends |S〉 = (|P ′〉 , |SA〉 , |MA〉) to Bob.
Verification phase:
Step V 1. Bob encrypts |P ′〉 and |SA〉 with KB and sends the quantum cipher-
text |YB〉 = EKB (|P
′〉 , |SA〉) to Trent.
Step V 2. Trent decrypts |YB〉 with KB and obtains |P
′〉 and |SA〉. Then he
encrypts |P ′〉 with KA and gets |ST 〉. If |ST 〉 = |SA〉 [8, 22], Trent sets
the verification parameter V = 1; otherwise, V = 0.
Step V 3. Trent recovers |P ′〉 from |ST 〉. Then he encrypts |P ′〉 , |SA〉 and V
with KB and sends the quantum ciphertext |YT 〉 = EKB (|P
′〉 , |SA〉 , V )
to Bob.
Step V 4. Bob decrypts |YT 〉 and gets |P
′〉 , |SA〉, and V . If V = 0, Bob rejects
the signature; otherwise, Bob continues to the next step.
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Step V 5. Based on Alice’s measurement resultsMA, Bob can obtain |P
′
B〉 from
the B particles received from the Step I2 according to the principle of
teleportation [8]. Then he compares |P ′B〉 with |P
′〉. If |P ′B〉 = |P
′〉, Bob
informs Alice to publish r and proceeds to the next step; otherwise, he
rejects the signature.
Step V 6. Alice publishes r on the public board.
Step V 7. Bob recovers |P 〉 from |P ′〉 by r and holds (|SA〉 , r) as Alice’s signa-
ture for the quantum message |P 〉.
2.2 Scheme 2: the AQS scheme without using entangled
states
Since the preparation, distribution, and storing of quantum entangled states are
not easily implemented with today’s technologies, Zou et al. also proposed an
AQS scheme without using entangled states (Scheme 2) in the signing phase
and the verifying phase. In order to prevent a signature from being disavowed
by Bob, a public board is also used in the proposed scheme. The scheme is
described as follows.
Initializing phase:
Step I1′. The arbitrator Trent shares the secret keys KAT ,KBT with Alice
and Bob respectively through some unconditionally secure quantum key
distribution protocols. Similarly, Alice shares a secret key, KAB, with
Bob.
Signing phase:
Step S1′. Alice chooses a random number r ∈ {0, 1}2n and then computes
|P ′〉 = Er (|P 〉) and |RAB〉 =MKAB (|P
′〉), where |P 〉 is as defined before.
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Step S2′. Alice generates |SA〉 = EKAT (|P
′〉).
Step S3′. Alice generates |S〉 = EKAB (|P
′〉 , |RAB〉 , |SA〉) as her signature and
then sends it to Bob.
Verification phase:
Step V 1′. Bob decrypts |S〉 withKAB and obtains |P ′〉 , |RAB〉 and |SA〉. Then
he generates |YB〉 = EKBT (|P
′〉 , |SA〉) and sends it to Trent.
Step V 2′. Trent decrypts |YB〉 with KBT and obtains |P ′〉 and |SA〉.
Step V 3′. Trent decrypts |SA〉 with KAT to obtain |P ′T 〉. If |P
′
T 〉 = |P
′〉, he
sets the verification parameter VT = 1; otherwise, VT = 0. Then Trent
announces VT on the public board. If VT = 1, he regenerates |YB〉 and
sends it back to Bob.
Step V 4′. If VT = 0, Bob rejects the signature. For otherwise, he decrypts
|YB〉 with KBT to obtain |P
′〉 and |SA〉. Then he computes |P ′B〉 =
M−1KAB (|RAB〉) and compares it with |P
′〉. If |P ′B〉 = |P
′〉, he sets the
verification parameter VB = 1; otherwise, VB = 0. Bob announces VB on
the public board.
Step V 5′. If VB = 0, Alice and Trent abort the scheme; otherwise, Alice an-
nounces r on the public board.
Step V 6′. Bob recovers |P 〉 from |P ′〉 by r and holds (|SA〉 , r) as Alice’s sig-
nature for the quantum message |P 〉.
3 Problems to be discussed
This section tries to investigate problems that could arise on Zou et al.’s schemes
if precautions are not taken. We first discuss the deniable dilemma. Then, we
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investigate the Trojan-horse attacks against the schemes.
3.1 The deniable dilemma
In Zou et al.’s schemes, the signatory Alice uses a random number r to protect
the quantum message |P 〉 (i.e., |P ′〉 = Er (|P 〉)) before signing it. After the ar-
bitrator Trent’s verification, Bob recovers |P ′B〉 and compares it with |P
′〉. Once
Bob informs Alice that |P ′B〉 = |P
′〉, Alice will publish r on the public board,
which is assumed to be free from being blocked, injected or alternated. Finally,
Bob recovers |P 〉 from |P ′〉 by r and retains (|SA〉 , r) as Alice’s signature.
It appears that if Bob informs Alice to publish r on the public board, then
he cannot disavow the integrality of the signature. Accordingly, Zou et al. con-
sidered that the use of the public board can prevent the denial attack from Bob.
However, if Bob claims that |P ′B〉 6= |P
′〉 in Step V5 (or Step V4’ in Scheme 2),
Trent cannot arbitrate the dispute between Alice and Bob because the following
three cases are possible. (This is particularly serious, if the signature scenario
occurs in an electronic block market, where Alice is a buyer and Bob, a block
company.)
1. Bob told a lie: In this case, Bob decides to forgo the recovery of the
message |P 〉 due to some unknown reasons;
2. Alice sent incorrect information to Bob: In Step S3 of Scheme 1, Alice
deliberately generated |φi〉 by another message
∣∣∣Pˆ ′i
〉
with
∣∣∣Pˆ ′i
〉
6= |P ′i 〉 or
generated |S〉 = (|P ′〉 , |SA〉 , |M ′A〉) with |M
′
A〉 6= |MA〉 in Step S5. In
Scheme 2, Alice intentionally sent |S〉 = EKAB
(
|P ′〉 ,
∣∣∣RˆAB
〉
, |SA〉
)
with∣∣∣RˆAB
〉
6= |RAB〉 to Bob in Step S3’;
3. Eve disturbed the communication.
Apparently, when Bob claims that |P ′B〉 6= |P
′〉, Trent cannot solve the dispute.
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Furthermore, as also pointed out in [15], the signer, Alice, is able to publish an
arbitrary r′ (6= r) in her favor without been verified, which is obviously against
the requirement of a signature scheme.
3.2 The Trojan-horse attack
In Zou et al.’s schemes, there are two transmissions of the same quantum signals,
i.e. first from Alice to Bob, and then from Bob to the arbitrator. Therefore, the
malicious Alice can reveal Bob’s secret key without being detected by performing
the Trojan-horse attacks [16, 17]. Similar to [5], there are two attack strategies
in the Trojan-horse attacks: the invisible photon eavesdropping [16] and the
delay photon eavesdropping [17]. The following will discuss the invisible photon
eavesdropping (IPE) on Zou et al.’s schemes and show that Alice can obtain
Bob’s secret key without being detected. Note that, Alice can also use the delay
photon eavesdropping to reveal Bob’s secret key in the same way.
In Scheme 1, in order to reveal Bob’s secret key KB, Alice can perform the
IPE attack on the communications in Step S5 and Step V 1 as follows:
Step S5a. Alice first prepares a set of eavesdropping states, Di ∈
{
1√
2
(|00〉+
|11〉)di
1
di
2
}
, as invisible photons, where the subscripts di1 and d
i
2 represent
the 1st and 2nd photons in Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each state in |P ′〉 (or |SA〉),
Alice inserts di1 as an invisible photon to that state and forms a new
sequence |P ′〉d1 (|SA〉
d1). Then Alice sends |S〉d1 =
(
|P ′〉d1 , |SA〉 , |MA〉
)
to Bob.
Step V 1a. Bob encrypts |P ′〉d1 and |SA〉 with KB and sends the quantum ci-
phertext |YB〉
d
1′ = EKB (|P
′〉d1 , |SA〉) to Trent. Before Trent receives the
quantum ciphertext |YB〉
d
1′ , Alice captures d1′ from |YB〉
d
1′ and measures
d1′d2 together with the Bell measurement. According to the measuring
result of di
1′
di2, Alice can obtain Bob’s secret key K
2i−1,2i
B .
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Note that, Alice can also use the similar ways mentioned above to obtain Bob’s
secret key KBT in Scheme 2. Since both Scheme 1 and 2 are insecure to the
Trojan-horse attacks, Bob can deny having verified a signature. Therefore, the
basic properties of a quantum signature, i.e. unforgeability and undeniability,
are not satisfied in their schemes.
4 Conclusions
This study has pointed out two security flaws in Zou et al.’s AQS schemes, in
which the arbitrator cannot arbitrate the dispute between Alice and Bob when
Bob claims failure in his verification. Besides, a malicious signer can obtain
verifier’s secret key by performing the Trojan-horse attacks. How to improve
their AQS schemes to avoid the problems mentioned in this paper will be an
interesting future research.
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